How Do Institutional Environments Affect Directors' Behaviors and Their Effectiveness? by YOSHIKAWA, Toru & Zhu, Hongjin
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School of
Business (Open Access) Lee Kong Chian School of Business
1-2012
How Do Institutional Environments Affect
Directors' Behaviors and Their Effectiveness?
Toru YOSHIKAWA
Singapore Management University, toru@smu.edu.sg
Hongjin Zhu
Follow this and additional works at:http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of theBusiness Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School of Business (Open Access) by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please emaillibIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
YOSHIKAWA, Toru and Zhu, Hongjin, "How Do Institutional Environments Affect Directors' Behaviors and Their Effectiveness?"
(2012).Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School of Business (Open Access).Paper 3285.
http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/32851 
 
 
 
 
How Do Institutional Environments Affect Directors' Behaviors and Their Effectiveness? 
 
 
 
Toru Yoshikawa 
Hongjin Zhu 
 
DeGroote School of Business 
McMaster University 
1280 Main Street West 
Hamilton, ON L8S 4M4  
Canada 2 
 
 
How Do Institutional Environments Affect Outside Directors’ Behaviors and Their 
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Abstract 
 
We examine how institutional environments affect outside directors’ behaviors and their 
effectiveness. Extant research on the board of directors has indicated that outside directors play a 
significant role in exercising independent control over management and providing resources. 
However, we know little about whether and how the relative importance of the two functions 
varies across different institutional environments characterized by distinct dominant exchange 
modes (contractual vs. relational). By differentiating between relationship-based and contract-
based exchange regimes, we develop a conceptual model to show how the differences in 
transaction structures influence the relative importance of outside directors as monitors and 
resource providers, and consequently the effectiveness of outside directors. We also argue that 
the relative emphasis on the two roles is contingent on culture. Furthermore, taking a dynamic 
perspective of institutions, we explore how outside directors’ behaviors change as institutions 
evolve from a relational one into a contractual one.   
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            The role of outside directors is becoming increasingly important globally. In the presence 
of many corporate scandals in recent years (e.g., Enron Scandal, WorldCom Fraud, etc.), an 
increased debate on and interest in the effectiveness of outside directors has emerged in 
academia, industry, and regulatory institutions in both developed and developing economies (e.g., 
Carter & Lorsch, 2004; CSRC, 2001; Peng, et al., 2003). Research of corporate governance 
suggests that outside directors play two roles: monitoring management and providing resources 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Monitoring involves the assessment 
of managerial decision making and performance. Agency theorists argue that the formal 
independence of outside directors leads to more objective evaluation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In 
addition to monitoring, outside directors also provide advice and counseling, information 
channels with external organizations, access to external resources, and legitimacy (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theory suggests that resource-rich outside directors 
enhance firm performance by serving as boundary-spanners who extract resources from the 
environment (Pfeffer, 1972).  
Although outside directors may theoretically help to improve firm performance, the 
empirical findings about the performance implication of outside directors are mixed. Some find 
that there is little relationship between outside directors and firm performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 
1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), while Westphal (1999) reports a positive effect of outside 
directors on U.S. firm performance resulting from the frequent advice and counsel interactions. 
Peng (2004) finds that outside directors of Chinese firms enhance sales growth by taking 
advantage of their widespread social ties, but they have little impact on financial performance 
such as return on equity.  4 
 
We suggest that a possible explanation of these divergent findings on the efficacy of 
outside directors may reside in the negligence of institutional environment in which the boards 
operate. In this study, rather than viewing boards functioning in an institutional vacuum, we 
argue instead that the behavior and effectiveness of outside directors are shaped by the 
institutional environments. Extant literature suggests that institutional environments greatly 
influence the strategy and performance of firms by defining the rules of interactions between 
human, and organizations (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). At the individual level, institutional 
environments affect how individuals engage in economic and social transactions with others 
because people are embedded in the institutional context (Granovetter, 1985). Institutions have 
the power to constrain and also to enable individual behaviors by setting up rules and norms 
(Hodgson, 2007). Since board members are also embedded in their local institutional context, 
their behaviors are expected to be influenced by such rules and norms.  
Prior research suggests that institutional environments can be broadly categorized into 
two types based on the dominant exchange regimes (North, 1990; Pearce, 2001; Peng, 2003). 
The first type is the contract-based environment where the transaction is characterized by 
impersonal exchange with third-party enforcement. The second type is the relationship-based 
environment where people rely on social networks to facilitate transactions with others. Focusing 
on these two types of institutional environments, we develop a conceptual framework to show 
how the different institutional environments shape the behavior of outside directors. Specifically, 
we argue that outside directors in the contract-based environment would emphasize both 
monitoring and resource provision roles, while they would place more emphasis on the resource 
provision role in the relationship-based environment. Such difference in the relative emphasis on 
the two functions determines the effectiveness of outside directors in various tasks. We also 5 
 
suggest that the relative importance of outside directors as monitors and resource providers is 
contingent on the cultural attributes of individualism vs. collectivism. Furthermore, taking a 
dynamic perspective of institutions, we indicate how outside directors’ behaviors change as 
institutions evolve from a relational one to a contractual one.   
This article makes several important contributions. First, by integrating the institutional 
perspective with research on board of directors, we highlight the importance of institutional 
context when we analyze directors’ behaviors and their effectiveness. We specifically advance 
the idea which integrates agency and resource dependence perspectives (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003) by incorporating the effects of dominant economic exchange mode in the institution to 
predict directors’ behaviors. We also extend the resource dependence argument on board capital 
by presenting the argument that one type of capital (i.e., human or social capital) is more useful 
in one context than in the other context. Further, we advance our knowledge on board 
effectiveness by specifying what goals certain directors’ behavior can achieve in a specific 
institutional context. Finally, we incorporate the dynamic aspect of directors’ behaviors by 
incorporating the recent theoretical development on institutional change.  
BEHAVIORS OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
Outside directors typically play two different roles: monitoring and resource provision 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Monitoring is emphasized in agency 
theory literature, which is based on the assumption that managers may act to maximize their own 
self interests (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This activity requires the assessment of 
CEO’s performance and strategic decision makings, based on both objective and subjective 
measures, and designing the CEO evaluation schemes including compensation and succession 6 
 
planning. In this role, it is argued from an agency theoretic perspective that the independence of 
outside directors from management is a critical factor for the directors to function effectively.   
A resource provision role is more consistent with a resource dependence perspective. 
Resource dependence research has focused on directors’ expertise, knowledge, and skills as well 
as their ties to external organizations, and their effects on organizational performance (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that such human and social capital is the 
antecedent of the directors’ resource provision activities. In this role, the board provides advice 
and counseling, information channels with external organizations, access to external resources, 
and legitimacy. In this perspective, however, directors’ incentives to provide their resources are 
not specified and the focus is rather on the board members’ ability to provide valuable resources 
to the firm (Dalton et al., 1998). Researchers have recently attempted to combine the directors’ 
resource provision and incentive issues by integrating agency and resource dependence theories 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In this article, we will focus on the relative importance of these two 
roles of outside directors in different institutional environments. 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND EXCHANGE MODES 
Institutional theory has been widely adopted in research of organization and management. 
The core argument of institutional theory is that the behaviors of people and organizations and 
their consequences are influenced by the institutions which structure human interactions (North, 
1990). The three pillars of institutions, namely regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars, 
provide the constraints and guidance on people’s behaviors (Scott, 2001). People need to follow 
such “rules of the game” so as to reduce uncertainty, obtain legitimacy, and thus survive in the 
changing environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; North, 1990). Since outside directors are 7 
 
embedded in the local institutional context just like other economic actors, we believe that 
institutional theory is useful in analyzing their behaviors and effectiveness. 
Although each institutional environment has unique characteristics in terms of economic 
exchange mode, there is a consensus that there are broadly two types; contract-based and 
relationship-based (Moran & Goshal, 1999; North, 1990; Peng, 2003). In an environment where 
contract-based transactions are prevalent, people reply on third-party contract enforcement when 
they enter into economic exchange with others. In such a contract-based institutional context, the 
formal legal and regulatory regimes govern the transaction. Hence, economic transactions are 
often conducted between arms-length exchange parties. Many developed economies, such as the 
U.S. and the U.K., belong to this category. The second type of exchange mode, relationship-
based, is widespread among most developing and emerging economies (Peng, 2003) and in some 
developed economies (Berger & Dore, 1996). Relationship-based transaction usually relies on 
specific personal relationships and hence economic exchange is often personalized (North, 2000). 
In this relationship-based institutional environment, people need to build wide and reliable social 
networks to facilitate transactions with others (Peng, 2003). Many institutions have both types of 
transaction mode and therefore, emphasis on either relational exchange or contractual exchange 
is not dichotomous but rather continuum. But for simplicity of our discussion, we develop our 
argument by separating the institutions into these two types. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
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We argue that the two exchange modes shape outside directors’ behaviors differently by 
affecting two factors: the role of social ties between managers and outside directors, and the 
relative importance of human capital and social capital (referred as director capital afterwards) 
possessed by outside directors. Due to the distinct roles of the two factors in relational and 
contractual environments, outside directors differ in their incentives and capabilities to get 
involved in monitoring and resource provision.  
Social Ties between Top Managers and Outside Directors 
In the relationship-based institutional environment, economic exchange often relies on 
personal relationships. Managers therefore attempt to build and nurture strong social networks 
through which they engage in relational transactions (Peng, 2003). In such a context, since the 
formal sanction mechanisms are not always effective, reliable, or sometimes absent (North, 
1990), managers have to depend on personal ties to reduce uncertainty and mitigate the risk of 
opportunism and moral hazard. This suggests that managers need to develop trust in their 
exchange partners through time-consuming interactions.  
Mayer et al., (1995: 712) define trust as the “willingness to be vulnerable to another party 
when that party cannot be controlled or monitored,” which entails risk because one exposes 
oneself to a vulnerable situation by trusting another. When trust is absent in an exchange 
relationship, one has to rely on monitoring to influence behaviors of one’s exchange partner and 
thereby reducing uncertainty and protecting oneself. This also means that when managers trust 
their exchange partner, they can lower their safeguards and leave more autonomy to their partner 
(McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003). However, strong oversight and control of one’s exchange 
partner in a low-trust relationship can create greater social distance and also lead to negative 9 
 
feelings between partners (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Sitkin & Roth, 1993), because such 
behavior send a negative signal to the other party. Westphal and Khanna (2003) find that outside 
directors who closely monitor and challenge their CEOs are often punished through social 
distancing in the U.S. context.  Indeed, the board norms in the U.S. appear to discourage board 
members from challenging CEO unless they need to replace him or her (Lorsch & Maclver, 
1989; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). It is expected that such mechanism is even greater in the 
relationship-based institutional context, because outside directors are deeply embedded in social 
networks where social distancing can have greater impact on their future appointments and 
access to other resources. Therefore, it is likely that the board norms in the relational context 
discourage outside directors from choosing behaviors such as objective monitoring that create 
greater social distance. 
Another aspect that will likely affect outside directors’ monitoring behaviors is the access 
to information. The literature on social networks suggests that strong ties tend to promote dense 
information flows within the social network (Granovetter, 1973). This suggests that in the 
relationship-based institutional environment where people heavily rely on their social networks, 
information is often shared among members within the same network. As a result, insiders and 
outsiders of the social network receive information different in quality and quantity. Therefore, 
in the relationship-based institutional environment, information asymmetry between those in the 
same social network and others tend to be large. If an outside director is not perceived and 
treated as an insider of the social network of management, his or her access to vital information 
can be constrained. Although there are usually formal rules that regulate management’s 
information disclosure to the board members even in the relationship-based institutional 
environment, some key information may be passed along informally through personal ties. This 10 
 
suggests that outside directors without strong ties with management are left out of the 
information loop, which makes their function less effective. Hence, it is likely that outside 
directors are not motivated to keep an independent relationship with management. This implies 
that monitoring is likely not a priority of outside directors.   
In the contract-based institutional environment, specific personal relationships are less 
important, because exchange partners rely on formal rules to conduct transactions and resolve 
any disputes (North, 1990). Since the exchange partners follow formal rules and regulations that 
stipulate each partner’s rights and responsibilities, they do not have to depend on personal 
relationships to reduce uncertainty and the risk of opportunism in economic exchange. While 
social networks do play a role even in such an environment, their importance in terms of access 
to information is expected to be lower than they are in the relationship-based environment, 
because appropriate information disclosure is usually enforced by formal rules. Therefore, 
compared to the relationship-based institutional environment, social ties are relatively less 
important in the contract-based institutional environment. Although, prior research (Westphal & 
Khanna, 2003) shows that outside directors who actively monitor their CEOs can be punished 
even in the contract-based environment such as the U.S., it is likely that they have more 
discretion to play a monitoring role because it is widely accepted that managerial monitoring is a 
part of their duties; i.e., monitoring is a contractually agreed upon responsibility for outside 
directors.   
The board norms that are based on personal relationships have important effects on not 
only monitoring but also resource provision. Close personal ties lead to higher commitment to 
the relationship and also encourage supportive actions (McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008; 11 
 
Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). Westphal (1999) argues that social ties between the directors and 
CEO encourage resource provision by the board members, because such ties make the directors 
feel more obligated to provide support to their CEO and also make the CEO feel more 
comfortable to seek advice from the directors. We expect that such norms of reciprocal 
commitment and support are especially strong in the relationship-based institutional environment, 
because people rely on specific personal ties established through long-term interactions to reduce 
uncertainty and protect themselves in economic exchange (North, 2000; Peng, 2003). Therefore, 
outside directors in the relationship-based institutional environment are likely to emphasize their 
resource provision role.  
The discussion above suggests that institutional environments affect the board norms, 
which in turn influence the directors’ incentives and their relative independence from 
management. In the relationship-based institutional environment, institutional norms are based 
on personal relationships in which trust with one’s exchange parties plays an important role. 
Therefore, outside directors are discouraged from behaving in a way that creates social distance 
from CEO and develops negative feelings in their relationship (Gulati & Westphal, 1999). In 
short, strict independence of outside directors is not critical or even undesirable. In such a 
context, outside directors are not encouraged to monitor their CEO objectively. Further, outside 
directors who play an arms-length monitoring function may not be able to perform their role 
effectively, because monitoring may lead to greater social distance which in turn affects the 
information flows between the directors and the CEO. Hence, the relationship-based context 
does not provide strong incentives for outside directors to play a monitoring role. On the other 
hand, due to the importance of personal ties in economic exchange and the board norms that 12 
 
reflect such values, outside directors are more likely to focus on a resource provision role to 
support their CEO as such a role is more consistent with the norms. 
In the contract-based institutional environment, it is expected that norms of reciprocal 
support are weaker because economic exchange is contract-based (Peng, 2003). In this context, 
therefore, personal ties are less important. This suggests that whether arms-length monitoring 
behavior causes social distance to grow is relatively less critical, because outside directors are 
expected to play that role based on formal rules, responsibilities, and board norms. Therefore, 
outside directors are likely to be less concerned about negative implications of their formal 
monitoring of the CEO. Further, they are expected not only to oversee the CEO’s strategic 
decision makings but also to provide advice and counseling if needed, as this is part of their 
expected responsibilities. Therefore, in this context, personal ties in the director-CEO 
relationship have smaller effects on directors’ behaviors compared to those in the relationship-
based institutional environment.  
Director Capital 
  From a resource dependence perspective, directors contribute to improve organizational 
performance using their human and social capital (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Human capital 
includes expertise, experience, knowledge, and skills that an individual has (Becker, 1964). 
Social capital, on the other hand, is an individual’s resources that derive from his or her social 
networks (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that director capital is 
the antecedents of the directors’ resource provision role. However, director’s capital is important 
not only for the resource provision role but also for the monitoring role. In order to assess CEO’s 
strategic decisions and performance, outside directors need to have some knowledge and 13 
 
expertise in some areas so that they can process the information competently and make 
appropriate judgment.  
What we want to ask here is; what type of director capital is more valuable in a specific 
institutional environment and how does that affect outside directors’ behaviors? There is an 
argument that human capital and social capital are difficult to separate, because they interact 
with each other and a director is often chosen not specifically for either his or her human or 
social capital (Colman, 1988; Lester et al., 2008). In our view, however, institutional difference 
in terms of the dominant economic exchange mode influences the relative value of each type (i.e., 
human and social) of director capital and consequently, behaviors of outside directors. In other 
words, a director may be chosen specifically for the type of capital he or she possesses. 
In the relationship-based institutional environment, economic exchange relies on specific 
personal relationships and therefore, social capital plays an important role in promoting 
economic exchange and reducing transaction costs (Peng, 2003). In such an environment, outside 
directors are likely to provide resources by taking advantage of their social capital (Au et al., 
2000). Moreover, outside directors are likely to be chosen based on their ability to leverage 
resources from external organizations. For example, politicians are often appointed as outside 
directors in the Chinese boards precisely because they have direct ties in the political networks 
(Peng, 2004). Therefore, while the director’s social capital is an important resource in the 
contract-based environment as well (Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008), we argue is that it is 
relatively more important in the relationship-based environment, because (1) the dominant 
economic exchange mode is relational and, (2) the monitoring function is less emphasized as 
discussed earlier and hence, human capital (i.e., professional knowledge and expertise) to assess 14 
 
CEO’s strategic decisions and performance is less critical. In other words, “who you know is 
more important than what you know” in such an environment (Peng, 2003). In our view, this 
relatively greater value of social capital motivates outside directors to emphasize their resource 
provision role in the relationship-based institutional environment. 
  In the contract-based institutional environment, both the director’s human capital and 
social capital are important. However, compared to the relationship-based institutional 
environment, the value of the directors’ social capital is likely to be lower in this environment, 
because the dominant mode of economic exchange is contractual and hence, there is smaller 
room for personal ties to play. Although personal relationships do have some role in this 
environment, people rely on formal rules and contracts to reduce uncertainty and moral hazard 
(North, 1990). Human capital of outside directors is important because their formal role includes 
monitoring of their CEO’s strategic decisions and performance, which usually requires some 
professional knowledge, expertise and experience. Hence, “what you know” is as important as or 
sometimes more important than “who you know” in this environment.  
  However, although the directors’ human capital and social capital are both valuable in the 
contract-based institutional environment, the directors’ resource provision role tends to be 
relatively less emphasized in the contract-based institutional environment compared to the 
relationship-based institutional environment for the following reasons. First, as discussed above, 
the value of the directors’ social capital tends to be lower in this environment and therefore, the 
directors have lower need and incentives to utilize their social capital compared to their 
counterparts in the relationship-based institutional environment. Second, the board norms are 
likely influenced by the formal rules and procedures rather than personal ties and hence, the 15 
 
director-CEO relationship is less affected by the social exchange norms that emphasize 
reciprocity and mutual support. Therefore, it is likely that the incentives of outside directors to 
provide their resources to the CEO are moderated by the formal institutional rules.  
  From our discussions on personal ties and director capital in the different institutional 
environment, we draw the following propositions:  
Proposition 1: In the relationship-based institutional environment, outside directors are more 
likely to emphasize their resource provision function.  
Proposition 2: In the contract-based institutional environment, outside directors are likely to 
emphasize both the monitoring and resource provision functions.  
Proposition 3: Comparing the relationship-based institutional environment and the contract-
based institutional environment, the resource provision role is more emphasized in the former. 
 
Contingency Exerted by Culture  
  We have so far discussed the impact of institutional environments on behaviors of outside 
directors without taking cultural differences into consideration. However, cultural values can 
possibly exert some effects on how business transactions are conducted (Peng, 2003). For 
example, even if the institutional environment has mechanisms to enforce contract-based 
transactions, relational exchange may still be preferred because of culture values that emphasize 
relationships. One cultural distinction that has been widely used in previous studies is 
individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995). Since people in a collectivist 
culture and an individualist culture tend to have difference values and orientations in their 
relationships with others, it is likely that the cultural differences affect how people prefer to 
transact with others.   16 
 
  One of the major differences between individualist culture and collectivist culture is the 
relative emphasis on personal relationships (Chen et al., 1998). Collectivists tend to value 
harmonious relationships with others even at the expense of task performance, while 
individualists are more focused on task performance rather than personal relationships (Kim et 
al., 1994). Also, behaviors of collectivist are more likely to be influenced by social norms and 
obligations and hence, they tend to emphasize conformity to such informal expectations.  
Individualists are, on the other hand, more likely to behave based on their personal values and 
beliefs (Davidson et al., 1976). These different attributes of individualists and collectivists are 
expected to have some impact on how people behave in economic exchange.  
  We have argued that people often engage in relational exchange in the relationship-based 
environment. In a collectivist culture, it is likely that this tendency is more emphasized 
regardless of the institutional environment, because the relational exchange is more consistent 
with their cultural values (Chen et al., 2002). In the context of the director-CEO relationship, this 
suggests that outside board members in the collectivist culture are more likely to emphasize their 
resource provision role as opposed to their monitoring role, because such activity is consistent 
with their cultural values. Also, in the collectivist culture where personal relationships are highly 
emphasized, it is likely that the directors’ social capital has higher values and hence, they are 
more motivated to use such capital. Further, monitoring activities are likely to be avoided in such 
a cultural environment, because such activities create social distance and can possibly strain the 
relationship (Gulati & Westphal, 1999). Hence, it is likely that the collectivist culture positively 
affects resource provision and negatively affects monitoring activities. On the other hand, 
individualist culture will likely have limited effects on the directors’ behaviors. Since 
individualist culture places less emphasis on relationships compared to collectivist culture, 17 
 
directors’ behaviors are more likely to be influenced only by the relative functional values of 
personal ties and their capital in the institution. This suggests that individualist culture will not 
positively nor negatively moderate the effects of institutional environments on the directors’ 
behaviors. Therefore, 
Proposition 4:  Collectivist culture positively moderates the relationship between resource 
provision and the institutional environment, whereas it negatively moderates the relationship 
between monitoring and the institutional environment.  
 
COMPLEMENTARITIES OF DIRECTORS’ BEHAVIORS AND INSTITUTIONS 
  Recent research on comparative corporate governance suggests that it is critical to 
examine complementarities of corporate governance practices when we analyze the effectiveness 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Khanna et al., 2006). For example, Aguilera et al. (2008) argue that 
independent directors, executive compensation, information disclosure, and takeover markets 
form a key set of complementary elements in the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance. In our view, this idea also applies to the complementary relationships between the 
directors’ two roles (i.e., monitoring and resource provision), types of director capital, and 
institutional environments. Different institutional environments call for different behaviors and 
different types of capital of outside directors for them to function effectively. It is also important 
to note, however, that each complementary set is beneficial for certain objectives, but it does not 
serve or even undermines other purposes. This implies that board effectiveness that derives from 
a specific complementary set can be assessed by different measures. Previous research (e.g., 
Aguilera et al., 2008) examines the relative effectiveness of different governance 18 
 
complementarities. But here, we present both specific benefits and costs in each complementary 
set. 
Benefits of Complementarities 
While certain role of the directors and institutional characteristics are in complementary 
relationships, the directors’ role serves different purposes in different institutional environments. 
In the relationship-based institutional environment, we argue that there are complementarities 
between the directors’ resource provision role and the relational economic exchange mode. Since 
economic exchange is largely based on personal relationships, outside directors can bring in their 
social capital to the board and promote relational transactions for the firm by leveraging their 
social networks. By using their external ties, outside directors can also help lower transaction 
costs and mitigate uncertainty and risk in economic exchange (Peng, 2004). Therefore, outside 
directors’ resource provision and their social capital are in complementary relationships with the 
relationship-based institutional environment. 
Proposition 5: Outside directors’ resource provision role and their use of social capital are in 
complementary relationships with the relationship-based institutional environment; this 
complementarity promotes relational transaction and lower risks and costs of such transaction. 
 
In the contract-based institutional environment, outside directors’ monitoring role is in a 
complementary relationship with the institutional environment. Formal rules and procedures 
require that outside directors oversee their CEO’s strategic decisions and performance. Outside 
directors can be held liable if they do not follow the proper procedure to monitor the CEO. In 
order for outside directors to play a monitoring role effectively, they are also required to be 
independent from management. Hence, all these arrangements are in complementary 
relationships with their monitoring role (Aguileta et al., 2008). Further, using their human capital, 19 
 
outside directors may be asked to provide their advice and counseling to their CEO. In fact, their 
task involves not only to monitor but also to advise the CEO by using their professional 
knowledge and expertise when the CEO makes strategic decisions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
However, due to the prevalence of the contract-based economic exchange mode, their social 
capital is likely to be less valuable in this context than in the relationship-based institutional 
environment as discussed earlier. Hence, outside directors’ effectiveness is likely dependent 
upon their performance in the two roles and their use of human capital. 
Proposition 6: Outside directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles and their use of 
human capital are in complementary relationships with the contract-based institutional 
environment; this complementarity promotes greater managerial monitoring and provision of 
counseling. 
 
Costs of Complementarities 
While outside directors’ behaviors that are in a complementary relationship with the 
institutional environment can be effective in achieving certain objectives, they are not able to 
fulfill other objectives or even cause problems. Outside directors serve to oversee managerial 
decision-makings and performance, including equitable allocation of firm resources and profits 
among shareholders and key stakeholders, and to provide counseling to the CEO (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). In the relationship-based institutional environment, outside directors’ focus on 
the resource provision role leaves their managerial control weak. This implies that outside 
directors are not effective in preventing management from acting opportunistically and thereby 
harming the interests of the firm’s stakeholders including shareholders. It is likely that the more 
important role the personal ties play in economic exchange and in the CEO-director relationship, 
the more the directors emphasize their resource provision role, the weaker the managerial 20 
 
monitoring by outside directors is. Hence, a strong complementarity between the directors’ 
resource provision and the relationship-based institutional environment will likely lead to less 
effective managerial monitoring by outside directors.  
Further, in the relationship-based institutional environment, enforcement of formal rules 
and regulations to ensure outside directors’ accountability may be weak (North, 1990). This may 
lead to another kind of cost. When the directors and managers belong to the same social 
networks in the relationship-based context, there is no mechanism to prevent the directors from 
extracting firm resources. In other words, the risk of resource appropriation exists not only from 
management but also from outside directors in this context. For example, in China which is a 
relationship-based institutional context, government officials often sit on the board as outside 
directors. Some regard that they accept the board positions because such appointments allow 
them to extract firm resources for their personal benefits (Cull & Xu, 2004). Hence, the risk of 
resource appropriation by outside directors themselves is another cost factor in the relationship-
based institutional environment.  
Proposition 7: Complementarities of outside directors’ resource provision, their use of social 
capital, and the relationship-based institutional environment increases the costs that arise from 
(a) risk of managerial opportunism, and (b) risk of resource appropriation by outside directors. 
 
In the contract-based institutional environment, outside directors serve to perform a 
managerial monitoring function as well as a counseling role. In this environment, outside 
directors’ social capital may not be fully leveraged, because such capital is not always useful in 
the contract-based and impersonal exchange context. Also, this environment emphasizes the 
independence of outside directors from the CEO and therefore, the directors are socially and 
emotionally not obligated to provide their resources to the CEO based on social exchange norms. 21 
 
This suggests that outside directors’ social capital tends to be under-utilized in the contract-based 
institutional environment, although opportunities to use such capital would be more limited in 
such an environment any way. This also implies that transaction costs that arise from designing 
formal safeguards against the risk of opportunism and moral hazard will increase (McEvily et al., 
2003). Further, information needs to be disseminated following the formal procedures to outside 
directors who usually lack intimate firm specific and industry knowledge and often have no other 
ways to obtain key information due to their independence. This raises bureaucratic costs 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). Hence,  
Proposition 8: Complementarities of outside directors’ monitoring and resource provision, their 
use of human capital, and the contract-based institutional environment increases the costs that 
arise from (a) under-utilization of the directors’ social capital, (b) formal safeguards against the 
risk of opportunism, and (c) formal bureaucratic procedures. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FUGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DIRECTOR BEHAVIORS 
Our discussions so far have treated institutions as relatively stable as consistent with the 
original notion of institutional theory. North (1990) views institutions as both formal and 
informal rules that constrain human interaction in a society. Scott (2001: 48) similarly defines 
institutions as “social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience” that are 
“composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements.” The common notion in 
these definitions is that institutions provide a framework or structure for social interaction and 
organizations gain legitimacy by following and accepting the both formal and informal rules 
within the institution in which they operate. Hence, institutions tend to reinforce the continuity of 
established systems and practices.  22 
 
However, institutions are subject to change due to external and internal pressures (Dacin, 
Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 2001). Institutional change is a 
process that entails change in the formal and informal rules of human interaction and in the 
enforcement mechanisms of such rules (North, 1990), or the deinstitutionalization of existing 
institutional practices (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Scott, 2001). Oliver (1992) distinguishes the 
functional, political, and social sources of institutional change. Functional pressures can arise 
when external market change or decline in economic performance may call into question the 
appropriateness or instrumental usefulness of existing systems or practices. Political pressures 
stem from rising performance crises and shifts in the interests and balance of power among the 
key players. Social pressures can arise from changing social expectations and norms or the 
emergence of a greater diversity of beliefs and practices within an institution. Hence, pressures to 
change existing practices come from multiple sources.  
Many economies that are characterized by relational exchange often adopt more contract-
based and impersonal transaction modes, as their institutions evolve and start implementing 
formal rules to regulate economic exchange (North, 1990). This type of change or transition can 
take place when economic transactions in the institution becomes too complex and social 
networks based on personal ties can no longer function effectively to reduce uncertainty and 
mitigate the risk of opportunism (Peng, 2003). However, regardless of the presence or absence of 
the gap between the existing economic exchange mode and the institutional rules, an institution 
sometimes faces external or internal pressures (often political or social) to adopt new rules and 
practices. In the area of corporate governance and the board of directors in particular, many 
countries and firms have been under rising pressures from global financial markets and 
international organizations to reform their system and practices (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 23 
 
2004; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Such a call for governance reforms often includes the 
adoption of independent outside directors as a monitor of management (Ahmadjian & Song, 
2004; Chizema & Kim, 2009; Peng, 2004). As a response, many countries have revised their 
corporate governance rules and regulations that require independent directors on the board of 
their domestic firms.  
When the institutional environment still relies on relational exchange, however, such 
reform measures may have negative effects on institutional complementarities between directors’ 
behaviors, director capital, and the economic exchange mode. The gap between the formal rules 
and the existing practices, which influences institutional norms, is often resolved by decoupling 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). At the organizational level, prior research shows that firms often 
decouple the actual practices from the officially claimed policy (Buck & Shahrim, 2005; Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004) when they confront pressure to adopt institutionally contested practices (Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007). Hence, while the firm adopts the formal rules that require the independence of 
outside directors who are responsible for monitoring management, it complies with such rules 
only superficially and does not enforce them and consequently, the actual practices may remain 
the same. For example, a firm can appoint an outside director who is independent according to 
the official rules but has some ties with management, or it can select an individual who is likely 
not to challenge management. This suggests that when there is a large gap between new 
governance rules and the institution’s economic exchange mode, symbolic compliance and 
decoupling will be likely to happen.  
Proposition 9: The greater the gap between the formal rules on outside directors, which 
emphasize their independence and monitoring responsibility, and the institutional environment, 
the more likely the firm will symbolically comply with the rules and less likely the outside 
directors will change their behaviors. 24 
 
 
  As economic transactions in the institution becomes more complex and incorporates 
more rule-based mechanisms and gradually develops the norms of contractual exchange, then the 
relationship-based institutional environment may evolve (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). Such an 
evolution can make impersonal and arms-length exchange less risky and consequently, the 
importance of personal ties in economic exchange will be reduced. This change in the 
institution’s economic exchange mode can possibly affect the directors’ behaviors in two ways. 
First, as the institution shifts toward the contract-based environment, it will have to establish 
more formal rules, including those on the roles of the board of directors, which govern economic 
exchange (Peng, 2003). As discussed earlier, adoption of formal rules can take place without any 
significant shift in the economic exchange mode, which, as we have argued, leads to decoupling. 
However, when the dominant economic exchange mode and the formal rules are not in conflict, 
chances of decoupling will be reduced and outside directors’ behaviors will be more likely to 
reflect the formal rules. As the institution moves toward the contract-based environment from the 
relationship-based environment, therefore, the organization may choose to adopt the new rules 
not symbolically but substantively and consequently, outside directors would adopt behaviors 
based on the formal rules that often emphasize their monitoring and control role. Hence, a 
narrower gap between the formal rules and the institution’s economic exchange mode will 
enhance chances of outside directors changing their behaviors. 
Proposition 10: As the gap between the formal rules on outside directors, which emphasize their 
independence and monitoring responsibility, and the institutional environment narrows, the 
more likely the firm will adopt and enforce the new practices and more likely the outside 
directors will change their behaviors; more emphasis on the monitoring role. 
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While enforcement of the formal rules or the regulative pressure would be a strong 
trigger of change in directors’ behaviors as such pressure has coercive power (Scott, 2001), shift 
in the relative value of directors’ capital due to the change in economic exchange mode can also 
affect their behaviors. When the dominant economic exchange mode becomes more contractual 
and impersonal, the directors’ social capital becomes relatively less useful and therefore, they 
have fewer opportunities to utilize such capital. Further, as discussed earlier, personal ties in the 
director-CEO relationship may also become less important as the board norms would be more 
influenced by the formal rules and procedures. The shift in economic exchange mode also makes 
the directors’ human capital relatively more valuable, as “what you know” becomes more 
important than “who you know.” This suggests that when the institution’s economic exchange 
mode changes significantly and becomes more contractual, outside board members will be more 
likely to change their behaviors with relatively less emphasis on resource provision role. 
Proposition 11: As the institution moves from the relationship-based environment to the 
contract-based environment, outside directors’ social capital becomes less and human capital 
more valuable, and consequently, they will be more likely to change their behaviors; reduce their 
emphasis on the resource provision role. 
 
As discussed earlier, it is likely that collectivist culture has a positive moderating effect 
on the directors’ resource provision and a negative moderating effect on their monitoring 
activities regardless of the institutional context. As it is unlikely that cultural attributes such as 
collectivism and individualism will change quickly during a short period of time, collectivist 
culture which emphasizes personal relationships is expected to moderate the relationship 
between the institutional environment and outside directors’ behaviors even after the institution 
incorporates more contract-based rules and practices. Hence,  26 
 
Proposition 12: Culture has a moderating effect on outside directors’ behaviors even after the 
institution has shifted to the contract-based environment; Outside directors are more likely to 
emphasize their resource provision role than the monitoring role in a collectivist culture than in 
an individualist culture.    
DISCUSSION 
Contributions 
  We have presented a conceptual model that incorporates research on the board of 
directors and an institutional perspective. Our main argument is that behaviors of outside 
directors (monitoring and resource provision) are influenced by the dominant economic 
exchange mode (relational vs. contractual) of the institution. We have also discussed the 
moderating role of culture, especially collectivist culture on the directors’ behaviors. Also, we 
have argued that complementarities of outside directors’ behaviors, capital, and the institutional 
environment will be effective in achieving certain objectives but not others. In other words, each 
complementary set entails some benefits as well as costs, because it is not structured to pursue all 
the goals. Further, we have presented an argument that institutional change may lead to change 
in directors’ behaviors. This could happen if such a change leads to new formal rules that are 
consistent with the economic exchange mode in the institution, and when directors are motivated 
to change their behaviors because the relative value of their specific types of resources also 
changes. Hence, our model incorporates dynamic aspects of the relationship between 
institutional environments and directors’ behaviors. 
  This article makes several contributions. First, our conceptual model shows that 
institutional environments have important effects on what outside directors can and are expected 
to do in a specific institutional context and hence, contributes to the literature on the relationship 27 
 
between governance and institutions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; 
Peng, 2004). Since outside directors are embedded in the local institutional environment, their 
behaviors in the boardroom are expected to be influenced in the institutional rules and norms. 
This article has presented the argument that links the institutional environment and directors’ 
behaviors and thereby proposing the multi-level model.  
Second, we have incorporated the moderating effects of culture on the directors’ 
behaviors. The impact of culture has not been explicitly discussed in the institutional theory 
literature. Previous governance research on the board does not incorporate the effects of culture 
either. However, it is natural to assume that social norms and the “rules of the game” in the 
institution are influenced by culture and therefore, the directors’ cultural orientation will likely 
affect how they behave in the boardroom. Our argument is that institutions and culture have an 
interaction effect on how outside directors behave in the boardroom. In this article, we have 
explicitly incorporated the effects of culture, especially collectivist culture on the directors’ 
propensity to emphasize their resource provision role as opposed to the monitoring role, even 
after the institution has shifted to a more relationship-based environment.  
Third, we have advanced the discussion on the director effectiveness by incorporating the 
concept of complementarities. Complementarities of corporate governance practices are 
becoming an important issue in research on international corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 
2008). Each institution has a set of existing practices as well as formal and informal rules that 
work together as a system (Schmidt & Spindler, 2004). Hence, new practices imported from 
another context may not function well in different environments. In this article, we have focused 
on complementarities between directors’ behaviors, their capital, and economic exchange mode 28 
 
in the institution. In the agency theory framework, outside directors are expected to play an 
independent monitoring role. From the resource dependence perspective, it is argued that outside 
directors can leverage their resources to enhance organizational performance. However, their 
monitoring function would not necessarily lead to expected or desired outcomes in some 
institutional environments, and the types of director resources or capital that are valuable may 
vary by institution. By incorporating the institutional perspective to corporate governance 
research, this article shows that it is important to consider a fit between directors’ roles, capital, 
and the institutional environment. Further, we have advanced the complementarity argument by 
specifying the benefits and costs of each complementary relationship. This argument also 
reinforces the view that complementarities do not always lead to greater effectiveness (Aguilera 
et al., 2008).  
Lastly, this article has addressed the impact of institutional change on directors’ 
behaviors. While institutions are often stable, they are subject to change due to external shock or 
pressures from internal and external forces (Dacin et al., 2002). Our discussion has framed the 
change in directors’ behaviors in the argument of institutional change. We have examined how 
changes in formal institutional rules without substantive change in the transaction mode can lead 
to decoupling even though the directors’ formal roles have changed. We have also presented the 
argument that directors’ behaviors would change only when there is consistency between the 
formal rules and the institution’s economic exchange mode. The key point here is a fit between 
the formal institutional rules and the institution’s dominant economic exchange mode. Further, 
the article has included the moderating role of culture. Specifically, we have argued that 
collectivist culture will have a positive moderating effect on the directors’ resource provision 
role even when the institution has implemented more contract-based transaction rules.  29 
 
Implications for Future Research 
By incorporating the influence of institutions, we believe that researchers will be able to 
examine the effectiveness of outside directors more accurately. Since each institution has a 
unique set of formal and informal rules, it constrains what outside directors are able to do. 
Further, those rules also determine how the directors can contribute to certain goals but not 
others, as certain behavior is more consistent with the institutional rules and norms. By including 
the institutional factors in the analysis, we will be able to go beyond the argument that greater 
monitoring of CEO by independent outside directors or greater board capital is beneficial to firm 
performance and shareholders.     
Second, there is a rising attention among researchers on complementarity of governance 
practices (Aguilera et al., 2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). However, there is still limited 
focus on multi-level complementarities. This article has focused on the complementary 
relationships between directors’ behaviors (i.e., monitoring and resource provision) and the 
institution’s economic exchange mode.  Future research can pay more attention to the 
relationship between macro or institution level factors and micro or individual level factors. 
After all, individual economic actors are also embedded in the institution and a fit between the 
different levels can have some important performance implications. 
Finally, future research on the board of directors may also benefit from incorporating the 
effects of culture, especially when we examine the individual-level behaviors. Most previous 
governance research especially on the board does not take cultural differences into consideration. 
However, cultural attributes such as collectivism and individualism may have important effects 
on how board members behave individually and also how group norms in the boardroom are 30 
 
shaped. For example, as we have discussed, directors might not be encouraged to play an active 
monitoring role in a collectivist culture where relationship are valued and group harmony is 
emphasized. Even in the individualist context such as the U.S., directors who challenge their 
CEO can be punished through social distancing (Westphal & Khanna, 2005). Such sanction may 
be even stronger in the collectivist culture. Future research on the board can address such an 
effect.  
CONCLUSION 
  There are a voluminous number of studies on the performance effects of outside directors 
and the board and yet, their conclusions are mixed. At the same time, there is a rising interest in 
comparative corporate governance that incorporates the institutional perspective. Our aim in this 
article is to advance the literature by connecting the research on the board of directors and 
studies on comparative corporate governance. The model we have developed here attempts to 
show that institutions matter when we examine the behaviors and effectiveness of outside 
directors and that the director’s effectiveness is influenced by multi-level complementarities. We 
hope that the arguments we have presented will motivate further research to enrich our 
understanding of the functioning of the board in diverse environments.   
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Figure 1: Institutional Environment, Outside Directors’ Behavior, and Outcome 
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Table 1: Comparison of the Two Institutional Types 
Institutional 
Type 
Director 
Behaviors 
Director 
Capital 
Benefits  Costs 
Relationship-
based 
Institution 
Resource 
Provision > 
Monitoring 
Social Capital 
> Human 
Capital 
Promotion of 
relational  
transaction; 
Lower transaction 
costs 
Managerial 
opportunism; 
Risk of resource 
appropriation by 
directors 
Contract-based 
Institution 
Monitoring > 
Resource 
Provision 
Human Capital 
> Social 
Capital 
Prevention of 
managerial 
opportunism; 
Provision of 
counseling if 
required 
Potential high 
transaction costs 
due to under-
utilization of 
directors’ social 
capital; 
Bureaucratic costs 
of information 
dissemination 
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